Disagreement Politics And Philosophy Pdf

7 12 2020

It follows that Honneth`s views on politics and political orders are themselves two types of “order”, but they are not incompatible: Ranciére`s criticism of “police regulation” begins at the very moment when the “recognitive” order of honnethia shows its restrictiveness and even its cynicism. If one could look for a tertium datur between these two theorists, it would consist in the revolutionary criticism of “police logic”, combined with the necessary work on the institutions of our recognitive order that reduce the influence of the “police” for “politics”. Finally, the conjunction “or” in the title of the tape can be taken not only as a signal of a “either-or” but also of a “and. This “agreement in principle” (p. 37, Deranty) is not between the lines, but is explicitly evoked by the belligerents, both of whom share a “commitment to the idea of a fight against injustice” (p. 40, Deranty). This is why this volume contains not only notions of disagreement, but also many points of comparison and intersection (see p. 68, Deranty) and invites the reader, in theory, between anarchic and “post-structural” distrust of normauté (p. 65) on the one hand and the optimist (or perhaps apocalyptic?) To believe in institutions that allow equality, freedom and recognition on the other side. In his sketch of Ranciére, the central elaboration of the inherently opposite logics of politics and the police, Honneth makes another small misstep. He argues that in Ranciére, “there is some tension between the reference to equality and the specific normative principle on which [all political orders] base the legitimization or justification of their own form of government” (p.

115). For those who know the work of Honneth (especially with his late right to liberty), his subsequent remark that he does not see “that this tension exists” (p. 116) is not surprising. Honneth and Ranciére`s differing perspectives on politics appear precisely in his insistence on “false” as the fundamental truth underlying all political orders (democratic or otherwise) and in Honneth`s sometimes benevolent blindness to the inadequacies and impasses of these normative political orders. Instead of criticizing the democratic order for its mere “promise” of democracy, which is in fact a “lie” involving a basic “false” element, he sees democracy as an institutional and political attempt at “inclusion” through the inevitable “social basis of exclusion” (p. 116): “All political orders must refer to the idea of inclusion so that there is an internal problem to justify forms of exclusion … (p. 116) That is why Honneth takes the point of view of the “sovereign,” “responsible” or “police.” In summary, what Ranciére criticizes as “police order” is enshrined in Honneth`s terminology “recognitive order” (p. 103): although it is still an order of rules, the recognitive order authorizes groups and individuals to commit acts that lead to inclusion rather than permanently excluding them. The phrase also expresses the paradox of politics itself, according to Ranciére. Politics, he says, begins when “demos” (the “excessive” or unrepresented part of society) attempt to disrupt the regime of domination and distribution of goods “naturalized” by the police and legal institutions. In addition, the term “equality” functions as a game of protest that constantly replaces litigation with political action and community action.