Tripoli Agreement 1971

13 04 2021

The most obvious consequence of the recent round of oil agreements is the significant increase in the revenues of producing countries from $7 billion in 1970 to about $18.5 billion by 1975 (without the new conditions, OPEC members` oil revenues would have increased to $10 billion in 1975). The impact on consumer countries will therefore be enormous. The cost of European oil imports was about $9.5 billion in 1970; By 1975, the increase in the costs of new OPEC settlements for Western Europe will reach up to $5.5 billion; For Japan, the increase will exceed $1.5 billion (the oil import bill was in the order of $2.5 billion last year). For developing countries, which cost about $2.1 billion in oil imports in 1970, the cost of OPEC`s advances for 1975 will be about $1 billion; For these countries, higher costs are likely to exacerbate new adverse chronic balances of payments. [iv] Unlike industrialized countries, which expect at least some intensification of export trade with oil-producing countries and, in addition, a large inflow of financing through their banking systems, less developed countries will find it difficult to offset the burden of their resources. In addition, several consumer countries may be forced to attempt direct oil negotiations with producing countries. OPEC and the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), their purely Arab arm, have ripped off this siren. And the appeal is reflected in a recent statement by a Spanish government official. He lamented that consumer countries were not represented in the Tehran negotiations and warned that Spain would try to get more oil through formal agreements with the Middle East and North African governments – and thus bypassing businesses – and paying by increasing exports to those countries. But it should be noted – emotional reactions to 1970-71, although direct negotiations between consumer and producing governments were not attractive either on the terms of trade or on security of supply, as shown by France`s experience with Algeria. Moreover, such negotiations still risk turning trade disputes into political confrontations between governments, which could doubly disrupt the vital oil trade.

That same year, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which had separated from the MNLF in 1977, began informal discussions with the Ramos government. However, these were not followed, and milF began to recruit and establish camps and become the dominant Muslim rebel group. Joseph Estrada`s government has called for a firm stance against it; Gloria Macapagal Arroyo tried to sign a peace agreement with him, but it was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the Philippines. [12] The two heads of state agreed to resurrect relations and reopen consulates. The agreement calls for a ban on the use of the territory of the two countries for hostile actions and the reception of the rebels between them. Libya intends to monitor the agreement to end hostile press campaigns and support for militant groups. However, Muammar Gaddafi called on the leaders of each country to continue discussions on resolving the cause of the tensions. The 1976 Tripoli Agreement was signed on 23 December 1976 in Tripoli, Libya, by Carmelo Z. Barbero, representing the Philippine government, and Nur Misuari of the Moro National Liberation Front.

[1] The agreement established autonomous administrative units for Muslims in the southern Philippines, the formation of an autonomous government, the Sharia justice system and special security forces, and compliance with a ceasefire. [2] The autonomous region should have its own economic system, including an Islamic bank. [3] With Gaddafi`s success, other countries have sought higher prices and companies have tried to unite.